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The World Economy 
in 1971. 
Amongst the OECD countries, the seven largest, (USA, Japan, West Germany, 
France, Britain, Italy and Canada), account for about 83% of total economic 
activity, while the United States itself accounts for no less than 35%. It 
may not be surprising therefore that what happens in the United States is of 
major consequence to the other advanced countries. While the intensity of 
the present recession varies from one country to another, the timing of the 
cycle is broadly uniform, and it would not be an exaggeration to say that 
most countries are closely watching events in the United States to see when 
the upswing there will materialise. The present circumstances therefore 
justify a rather more detailed look at the present situation of the United 
States economy than is normally the case in this section of the Commentary. 
In mid-July of each year the United States government is required by law to 
publish its official economic forecasts for the next eighteen months. The 
current official view is that real GNP will grow at an annual rate of 
between 4$ and 5% from now until the end of 1983. While other forecasts 
are much less optimistic, generally falling in the range from 2% to 4$, all 
agree that growth is on the way. Yet it is well to remember that one year 
ago a poll of 18 US economic forecasting organisations showed an average 
expectation of a rise in the US real GNP of over 4% in the following nine 
months. The actual outcome is now estimated to have been a fall of more 
than 5%. Judging the recovery of the US economy at the present time is 
just as hazardous as it was twelve months ago, if not more so. 
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On the positive side is the fact that after six months of sharp decline, GNP 
did begin to grow again in the second quarter of this year; however, this 
was due primarily to a reduction in the rate of destocking by industry. 
Again, the combined index of leading indicators has increased in each of the 
three months April, May and June of this year after falling successively for 
the previous eleven months. Finally, a stimulus to aggregate demand has 
been provided by the Federal income tax cuts and pensions increases which 
took effect on 1 July. 
On the negative side, interest rates remain high - in real terms around 8% -
even though inflation has fallen sharply to below 7%. It is not simply the 
high level of interest rates which is discouraging borrowers coming to 
financial markets, it is also the hope that they may come down further which 
is causing them to defer their investment decisions. On the other hand 
would-be lenders are unwilling to commit themselves to lower interest rates 
since they feel that inflationary pressures and thus interest rates may rise 
again. Their views are founded on two considerations, one short-term, the 
other long-term. The short-term consideration is that political pressures 
generated by the prolonged duration of the recession will cause the Federal 
Reserve to loosen further its shaky control of the money supply. The other 
consideration is the failure of the Reagan administration to control the 
size of its foreseeable budget deficits. It is reliably estimated that the 
1983 budget deficit will be between $141 billion and $151 billion and that 
for the next two years deficits will remain in the range of $145 to $160 
billion. 
A further negative feature of the US scene is that businessmen, faced with 
the fact that their capital costs are rising faster than the prices they 
receive for their final products, are suffering a severe squeeze on their 
sales and profits, and take a more pessimistic view of the future than do 
other observers. Other negative indicators include the fact that 
industrial production declined in June for the tenth month out of the past 
eleven, while housing starts fell by 15% following a one month increase, and 
new orders for non-defence capital goods fell by 5.5?. There was also a 
sharp drop in retail sales in June. 
Taken together, all of these indicators suggest that no short-term forecast 
of the US economy can be offered with any degree of confidence. The most 
likely outcome remains a slow recovery throughout the remainder of 1982, but 
its fragility will make it unusually vulnerable to any surprise 
developments, whether these be of a political, technical, or financial 
character. 
The outlook in West Germany is equally uncertain. On the one hand, 
official forecasts by the government and by OECD expect a recovery in the 
second half of the year, leading to a rate of growth of output of around 3% 
in 1983. Supporters of this optimistic view can cite an anticipated 
favourable effect on consumer spending of the continuing fall in the rate of 
inflation, (now around 5%), and the fact that this year's wage settlements 
(around 4%) offer Germany continuing labour cost advantages in export 
markets. There have also been recent signs of recovery in the housing 
construction sector. This, however, is sensitive to interest rates, which 
have recently stopped falling. 
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The negative indicators include a dip in export orders, a continuing decline 
in domestic orders and in the IFO indicator of business confidence. There 
was a sharp rise in industrial production in the month of June. The 
pessimistic consensus is that real output growth next year may be in the 
range of 1.5$ to 2%, while there will be no growth at all in 1982. 
However, both optimists and pessimists are agreed on their forecasts of 
unemployment. The rate is expected to rise from its present 1.2%, (compared 
to 5.356 twelve months ago), to 8? next year. 
If, as seems likely, the growth rate of GNP proves to be less than the 
optimists believe, this will imply a higher net borrowing requirement than 
planned by the government, an outcome which could easily be the final 
breaking factor in the increasingly fragile SDP-FDP political coalition. 
Sustained by domestic demand, Japan is expected to achieve a growth rate of 
output of around 2% in 1982, less than half the rate achieved in the decade 
between 1970 and 1980. The prospects for the Japanese economy are clouded 
by the simmering trade disputes with the United States and the EEC. These 
could lead to the unilateral imposition by other countries of trade barriers 
to Japanese exports, which could have catastrophic consequences. The 
Japanese balance of payments surplus on current account is once again rising 
rapidly. Ironically, the failure of the yen to adjust upwards is largely 
attributable to the capital outflows provoked by the current level of US 
interest rates. 
Since the devaluation of the franc, growth forecasts for France have been 
continuously revised downwards. While the government had originally hoped 
for a 3% growth rate this year, (following a 0.3% rate of growth in 1981), 
the latest semi-official forecast is that the rate may fall "below 21". 
Further, a recent survey of business opinion, finds that business men 
foresee "no improvement in production in the coming months". 
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The U.K. Economy 
h i r e purchase r e s t r i c t i o n s should provide 
though 
1982, e 
in even 
Whi l e t h e w o r l d economy has 
slowed down d r a m a t i c a l l y , the UK 
economy seems becalmed. Although 
i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n f e l l in 
J u l y a t l e a s t GDP i s n o t 
d e c l i n i n g as i t d id d u r i n g 1980 
and 1981. However as y e t t h e r e 
a r e no s t r o n g i n d i c a t i o n s of a 
r e v i v a l in economic a c t i v i t y . 
Consumer demand h a s r e m a i n e d 
f a i r l y s t a b l e d u r i n g t h e l a s t 
t h r ee q u a r t e r s though d isposable 
i n c o m e h a s b e e n f a l l i n g . 
I n d i v i d u a l s have been prepared to 
reduce t h e i r savings and increase 
b o r r o w i n g even though i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s h a v e been p e n a l l y h i g h . 
The i n e r t i a of c o n s u m p t i o n 
s p e n d i n g r e f l e c t s c o n s u m e r ' s 
u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o a c c e p t lower 
l i v i n g s t a n d a r d s even t h o u g h 
t h e i r income has been r educed . 
The d e c l i n i n g r a t e of i n f l a t i o n 
w i l l a l s o have s t a b i l i s e d t he 
value of consumers' l i q u i d a s s e t s 
and c o n s e q u e n t l y may h a v e 
p r o v i d e d some s m a l l s t i m u l u s t o 
c o n s u m p t i o n . The removal of 
a fu r the r boost to demand. Even 
t h e c r e d i t advances were a l r e a d y a t r e c o r d l e v e l s in f i r s t h a l f of 
a r l y i n d i c a t i o n s suggest t h a t the removal of r e s t r i c t i o n s w i l l r e s u l t 
h igher l e v e l s during the second hal f . 
During t h e l a s t few q u a r t e r s t h e r a t e of d e c l i n e in s t o c k l e v e l s has been 
d r a m a t i c a l l y reduced (see Figure 1). This has been the most s i g n i f i c a n t 
f a c t o r b r i n g i n g abou t a s t a b i l i s a t i o n in t o t a l e x p e n d i t u r e . As y e t , 
however, t he re i s no evidence of any r e t u r n to s i g n i f i c a n t s tockbu i ld ing as 
one might e x p e c t a t t h i s s t a g e of an economic c y c l e . When r e a l r a t e s of 
i n t e r e s t were e x t r e m e l y low, i n d u s t r i a l i s t s were not too concerned about 
m a i n t a i n i n g a f a i r l y h igh s t o c k / o u t p u t r a t i o t o meet any u n a n t i c i p a t e d 
f l u c t u a t i o n s in demand. With r e a l r a t e s of i n t e r e s t now much h igher , the 
c o s t s of such a s t r a t e g y seem t o have ou twe ighed the b e n e f i t s . The 
i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s development a re twofold: f i r s t l y , wi thout a r e t u r n to 
lower r e a l r a t e s of i n t e r e s t , the upward impetus normally generated a t t h i s 
s tage of the cyc le by the r e b u i l d i n g of s tocks w i l l be d r a s t i c a l l y reduced. 
Second ly , i f B r i t i s h b u s i n e s s e s now e x p e c t t o work w i t h p e r m a n e n t l y 
l o w e r / s t o c k o u t p u t r a t i o s t h e i r c a p a c i t y t o meet u n f o r e s e e n changes in 
demand w i l l be r e d u c e d . I f d o m e s t i c s u p p l i e r s a r e unab l e t o meet sudden 
i nc r ea se s in o r d e r s , purchasers w i l l i n e v i t a b l y tu rn to fore ign s u p p l i e r s t o 
f u l f i l l t h e i r r e q u i r e m e n t s . Without a p a r a l l e l i n c r e a s e in the f l e x i b i l i t y 
of p r o d u c t i o n , any move to p e r m a n e n t l y lower s t o c k / o u t p u t r a t i o s i s 
p o t e n t i a l l y very dangerous. 
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The l e v e l of i n v e s t m e n t was f a i r l y s t e a d y t h r o u g h o u t 1981. There was an 
i n c r e a s e of £210m t o £5.1bn in t h e f i r s t q u a r t e r of 1982. However, t h i s 
improvement came about l a r g e l y as a r e s u l t of increased c a p i t a l expendi ture 
in t h e s e r v i c e and d i s t r i b u t i o n s e c t o r s . While some of t h e a s s e t s 
purchased by these s e c t o r s may subsequently be leased to manufacturers , the 
raw f i g u r e s for the manufacturing sec to r (see Fig 2) are extremely gloomy. 
With t he demand fo r t h e i r goods f a l l i n g , i n d u s t r i a l i s t s n a t u r a l l y have 
become more r e l u c t a n t t o i n v e s t in new p l a n t and equ ipmen t . Again, h igh 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s may have been a c o n t r i b u t o r y f a c t o r even though many 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s can ob ta in cons iderab le government a s s i s t a n c e in the purchase 
of equipment. 
Exports dec l ined by 5.3% in the f i r s t qua r t e r of 1982 though even a t t h i s 
l eve l they were s t i l l 2.9% above the f i gu re for the equ iva len t q u a r t e r of 
1981. The t r ade ba l ance , with the a s s i s t a n c e of North Sea o i l , i s s t i l l in 
h e a l t h y s u r p l u s . Many of t h e p u n d i t s , however , see i n c r e a s e d e x p o r t s as 
the most p l a u s i b l e and d e s i r a b l e means of r e c u s s i t a t i n g t h e UK economy. 
The most favoured means of b r ing ing t h i s about would be to use i n t e r e s t r a t e 
r e d u c t i o n s t o f o r c e a d e c l i n e in t h e exchange r a t e . The p e r c e i v e d 
advantage of t h i s s t r a t e g y i s t h a t , l i k e the removal of HP r e s t r i c t i o n s , i t 
s a t i s f i e s t he m o n e t a r i s t s h i b b o l e t h t h a t t h e r e should be no i n c r e a s e in 
government s p e n d i n g which could p o s s i b l y be i n t e r p r e t e d as s t i m u l a t i n g 
demand. Unfor tunate ly i t neg l ec t s some of the l e s sons of the past and the 
r e a l i t i e s of the p r e s e n t . 
All previous exper ience sugges ts t h a t i t t akes some t ime for a reduct ion in 
the exchange r a t e t o a f f e c t t h e volume of e x p o r t s . I ndeed , in t he s h o r t -
run t he r e may be a pe rverse e f f ec t on the balance of t r ade depending on the 
r e s p e c t i v e r a t e s a t which export and import p r i c e s are r ea l igned . Treasury 
e s t i m a t e s s u g g e s t t h a t i t w i l l t a k e between two and four y e a r s b e f o r e t he 
e f f e c t s of a change in c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s peak . Though t h i s r e s u l t may be 
consonan t w i t h o n e ' s b e l i e f s in r e g a r d t o o r d e r and d e l i v e r y l a g s , i t 
c e r t a i n l y can g i v e l i t t l e comfo r t t o t h o s e who b e l i e v e in t h e e f f i c a c y of 
exchange r a t e r e d u c t i o n s as a means of escaping from the immediate economic 
problems. 
Fur the r , as i s c l e a r from the previous s e c t i o n , the r e s t of the major world 
economies a r e a l s o e x p e r i e n c i n g r e c e s s i o n a r y p rob lems a t p r e s e n t . I t i s 
l o g i c a l l y imposs ib le for each of these c o u n t r i e s to escape these problems by 
s imul taneous ly holding down domest ic demand and expanding expor t s . While 
i n d i v i d u a l g o v e r n m e n t s may see t h i s as d e s i r a b l e , i t i s only c o n c e r t e d 
a c t i o n t o i n c r e a s e demand which w i l l p u l l t h e world economy out of 
r eces s ion . Those c o u n t r i e s with very l a rge t rade surp luses w i l l come under 
most p r e s s u r e t o t a k e a c t i o n t o r e f l a t e . The UK, a t p r e s e n t , has t h e 
l a r g e s t cu r ren t account balance in the developed world. 
F i n a l l y , those who c u r r e n t l y advocate exchange r a t e r educ t ions seem to have 
f o r g o t t e n t h e a rgument t h a t t h e p r i c e l e v e l i s no t i ndependen t of such 
r e d u c t i o n s . The p r i c e s of those t raded goods for which demand i s i n e l a s t i c 
a re bound t o r i s e t o compensa te fo r t h e f a l l in t h e exchange r a t e . In an 
economy as open as t h a t of t h e UK i t i s absu rd t o b e l i e v e t h a t c o n d i t i o n s in 
the t r ade sec to r w i l l not a f f ec t the p r i c e l e v e l . 
Pe rhaps t he f i x a t i o n w i t h exchange r a t e r e d u c t i o n s w i l l d i s a p p e a r in t he 
same way t h a t i n t e r e s t in month-to-month f l u c t u a t i o n s in the money supply 
has d e c l i n e d . C e r t a i n l y , such a p o l i c y can p r o v i d e no panacea fo r t he 
p r e s e n t s t a g n a t i o n in t h e B r i t i s h economy. There a r e no s t i m u l a t o r y 
p o l i c i e s w h i c h do n o t c a r r y a r i s k of i n c r e a s i n g t h e r a t e of p r i c e 
i n f l a t i o n , even p o l i c i e s which do not i n v o l v e government s p e n d i n g . The 
government must su re ly be aware of t h i s and the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t i t w i l l be 
p r e p a r e d to run such r i s k s must be i n c r e a s i n g as an e l e c t i o n looms ever 
c l o s e r . 
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